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POST WORLD WAR II SEARCH FOR NEW REGIONAL AND NATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
In the aftermath of World War II, Europe searched for new regional
and national institutions which would protect human rights and prevent
reoccurrence of the massive tragic violations it had experienced. The
Council of Europe with its innovative European Convention on Human
Rights emerged at the European regional level.' At the national level,
individual States adopted constitutions which included guarantees of
human rights, and also created special Constitutional Courts from which
courts facing allegations of violations of constitutional rights could
obtain binding determinations of constitutional incompatibility. Italy and
Germany led many European countries in adopting a "centralized"
system of judicial review vesting the power to review the
constitutionality of norms or actions in a single specialized court.
PROVISIONS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN THE 1948 ITALIAN
CONSTITUTION
The 1948 Italian Constitution contains a provision for creation of a
Constitutional Court with the power of centralized judicial review.2
During a transitional period, the Italian 1948-1956 constitutional
experience implemented a diffused decentralized judicial review system
which permitted judges in the ordinary courts and administrative courts
to decide constitutional questions. This experience and the associated
1. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
2. The previous system, under the flexible Constitution of the Statuto Albertino, did.
not provide for any judicial review of the constitutionality of laws.
Centralized (sometime also referred to as "concentrated") judicial review differs
from decentralized (sometimes referred to as "diffused") judicial review). In a
centralized judicial review system constitutional issues must be certified immediately to
the Constitutional Court for resolution as soon as they arise in any court. The
proceedings in the transmitting court are held in abeyance pending the decision of the
Constitutional Court. In a decentralized system ofjudicial review, the court in which the
constitutional issue arises renders its decision on the constitutional issue. Depending on
the status of the court and the notion of stare decisis in the relevant legal system, the
effects of decentralized determinations of constitutionality might be limited to the
litigants at hand or have more general effect.
For a discussion of the differences between centralized and decentralized systems of
judicial review, see MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REvIEw IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD 45 (1971); Louis Favoreau, Constitutional Review in Europe, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
ABROAD (Louis Henkin & A.J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); V.C. JACKSON & M. TUSHNET,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 464 (2d ed. 2006); N. DORSEN ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 113 (2003).
[Vol. 28:3
INTRODUCTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ITALY
politics of initiating the work of the Italian Constitutional Court3 provide
an interesting case study on the impact of transplants and the
identification of conditions which facilitate or hinder the success of the
transplant-in this instance the implementation of judicial review of the
constitutionality of laws. Articles 134-137 of the Italian Constitution, as
adopted in 1948, provide the basic structure, functions and features of the
Constitutional Court.4 Under Article 135, the Constitutional Court is
composed of fifteen judges, five are appointed by the Parliament in joint
session, five are appointed by the President of the Republic and five are
appointed by the supreme ordinary and administrative courts (the Court
of Cassation, the Council of State, and the Court of Accounts).' Article
137 of the Constitution left the details of launching the Constitutional
Court to subsequent "constitutional" legislation, that is, legislation
adopted by procedures to give the legislation the rank of the Constitution
itself.6  Transitional and Final Provision no. VII of the Italian
Constitution specifies that: "[u]ntil such time as the Constitutional Court
begins its functions, the decision on controversies indicated in article 134
shall be conducted in the forms and within the limits of the provisions
already in existence before the implementation of the Constitution."7
EXPERIMENT WITH DECENTRALIZED JUDICIAL REVIEW DURING THE
1948-1956 TRANSITION PERIOD
Although the Constitutional Court was contemplated directly by the
1948 Italian Constitution, it became operative only eight years later, in
1956, after the adoption of the constitutional laws in 1948 and 1953
3. Disputes between private parties are handled by the so-called "ordinary" courts
in Italy and in civil law countries generally. Disputes between private parties and the
State are handled by the "administrative" courts in Italy and in other civil law countries
that follow the inspiration of French administrative law. For a discussion of the
"ordinary" courts and "administrative" courts in Italy, see Louis F. Del Duca & Patrick
Del Duca, An Italian Federalism?-The States, its Institutions and National Culture as
Rule of Law Guarantor, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 799, 835 (2006). As indicated in the text,
supra, Constitutional Courts with jurisdiction solely over constitutional matters
developed in Europe after the Second World War, following the model of the Austrian
Constitutional Court that was implemented between World Wars I and II.
4. Costituzione [COST.] arts. 134-37 (It.), available at http://www.senato.it/
documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzionejinglese.pdf.
5. Id. art. 135.
6. Id. art. 137.
7. Disposizioni transitorie e finali della Costituzione VII [Transitional and Final
Provisions of the Constitution] (It.). See also COST. art. 134 ("The Constitutional Court
shall pass judgment on controversies on the constitutional legitimacy of laws and
enactments having force of law issued by the State and Regions.").
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required for its implementation.8 Under the above quoted provisions of
the Constitution, and before establishment of the Constitutional Court,
Italy briefly experimented (1948-1956) with a decentralized system of
judicial review, pursuant to which ordinary courts and administrative
courts could refuse to apply laws they deemed unconstitutional. During
this eight-year period, every ordinary and administrative court had the
opportunity to interpret the new Constitution and to decline to apply laws
determined to conflict with the Constitution.
In the Italian legal system, then and now, a ruling by a higher
ordinary or administrative court (as distinguished from the Constitutional
Court)9 does not constitute binding precedent. Each court decides
according to its own interpretation of the law. Accordingly, during the
transition period, decisions, even of a high court, that found legislation
incompatible with the Constitution or other subsequent law were of equal
value whether based on constitutional review per se or on the notion of
statutory interpretation that the more recent law trumps the older law.
The proponents of judicial review generally recognized that the fascist
era judges would stumble on the notion of constitutional review for
reasons including (i) a legal culture imbued with antipathy to any
"gouvernment des juges," (ii) possible sympathy to the legislation
adopted during the regime under which they had become judges, and
(iii) reluctance to challenge actions of the transitional (and unelected)
government that took power on the fall of the fascists.' In the period
following the 1948 entry into force of the Constitution, discernable
willingness to defer constitutional review to the Constitutional Court as
and when created existed."
Ordinary and Administrative Courts'Avoidance of Overt Constitutional
Review-Deferral of the Programmatic or Peremptory Status of the Civil
Rights' Provisions of the Constitution
Moreover, one Italian author, Bignami, suggests that the Italian
ordinary courts widely ducked the issue of using the Constitution to
invalidate the questionable legislation of the post-fascist government that
held power in Italy prior to the implementation of elections under the
8. The laws that implemented Art. 137 Const. are Constitutional Law n. 1 of
February 9, 1948, Constitutional Law n. 1 of March 11, 1953 and Law n. 87/ of March
11, 1953.
9. See supra notes 3, 7.
10. See, among the many, Cappelletti, supra note 2, at 63-64. See also P.
Calamandrei, Come sifa a disfare una costituzione, in DIEM ANNI DoPo: 1945-1955 209-
316 (A. Battaglia, P. Calamandrei, E. Corbino, G. de Rosa, E. Lussu, M. Sansone, L.
Valiani eds., Laterza, 1955).
11. See Calamandrei, supra note 10, at 251 et seq.
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1948 Constitution (and that accordingly had no democratic legitimacy)
by relying on the notion of statutory interpretation that the more recent
law trumps the older law. 12 This, Bignami suggests, was the technique
preferred in lieu of overt constitutional review in order to start the
process of revisiting objectionable aspects of the fascist era legislation.13
Moreover, Bignami finds leaving the constitutional questions about the
legislative actions of the unelected interim government to the then
imminently anticipated initiation of the Constitutional Court to be a
prudent strategic choice in the perspective of the political consequences
associated with any challenge to the post-fascist government. 14
Bignami also considers the willingness, insofar as it existed in the
lower courts in the period 1948 to 1956, of the ordinary courts' to
consider prior law, specifically decrees of the transition government,
invalid on grounds of incompatibility with later law (when the later law
is understood as the constitution itself) as a salutary reassertion of the
judiciary's independence from the executive, particularly at a time when
no parliament existed. The political battles over control of the
government in fact delayed the creation of the Constitutional Court.
5
Bignami alludes to the initial support of the Christian Democrats for the
Court when they feared a communist majority, and their subsequent
waffling on the desirability of the Court as they realized that they
themselves, rather than the communists, would control the government.1
6
Bignami understands the rulings of the lower courts as asserting judicial
autonomy from the political issues of the other branches of
government. 17
Constitutional review, centralized or not, was alien to the Italian
legal system.18 The post war years through 1956 are an example of
laying the foundations for successful rooting of a transplant. They
illustrate the political developments and process associated with a
successful transplant. The institution of the Constitutional Court as an
entity for the conduct of centralized review was a clever way to
overcome the limitations of training and appointment of the ordinary and
administrative judges. Selected on the basis of their performance in
competitive examinations and functioning under the Statuto Albertino
Constitution (which was changeable at the whim of the ruling majority
12. See MARco BIGNAMI, COST1TUZIONE FLESSIBILE, COSTITUZIONE RIGIDA E
CONTROLLO DI COSTITUZIONALITA IN ITALIA (1848-1956) (Giuffr& 1997).
13. Id. at 165.
14. Id. at 177.
15. Id. at 149-150.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 151.
18. The former Italian Constitution, the Statuto Albertino, enacted on March 4, 1848,
was a flexible Constitution which had not established a system of judicial review.
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party under the direction of a Prime Minister appointed by the King),
some judges during this period were unreceptive to the innovative
constitutional principles embedded in the new Italian Constitution.'
9
In a decision issued within six weeks of the effective date of the
1948 Constitution, the Court of Cassation declared that the bulk of the
civil rights provisions of the new Constitution could not be considered
self-executing or peremptory (precettive) but were merely programmatic
(programmatiche) and therefore had to be implemented by the
legislature, before they could be applied by a court.2 °
In Marcian6, the instant case, nine men, of whom four were
fugitives, challenged their convictions pursuant to Decreti Leggi
Luogotenenziali no. 119 of July 27, 1944 and no. 142 of April 22, 1945
for the crime of "military collaboration with the German invader" that
had led to death and serious injuries. 2' The collaboration with which
they were charged occurred prior to April 22, 1945, that is before the
issuance of the Decreto Legge Luogotenenziale no. 142 that was an
essential element of the formal definition of their actions as criminal.22
As part of the same decision, an additional man challenged his
conviction of murder pursuant to Decreto Legge Luogotenenziale no.
159 of July 27, 1944 for a 1921 murder of an antifascist man of which he
had been absolved in 1922, but which absolution had been disregarded
for purposes of the post-war conviction on grounds of the "moral
coercion imposed by fascism" at the time of the absolution.23 In each
case, the challenge was to decrees of the unelected government that
24followed the collapse of the fascist state. The defense of the accused
was that since the alleged actions occurred prior to the passage of the
military collaboration law, the prohibition against ex post facto laws in
the Italian Constitution was a bar to being convicted of the crime.25
In rejecting this defense argument, the United Criminal Chambers
of the Court of Cassation considered two grounds to abstain from
26watocnldthttecinainvalidating the convictions. Its first was to conclude that the criminal
code prohibitions on retroactive definition of criminal conduct did not
19. Judges of the ordinary and administrative courts were and currently still are
selected on the basis of their performance in competitive examinations. For a discussion
of these selection processes, see Del Duca & Del Duca, supra note 3, at 831.
20. See Cass., sez. un. pen., 7 Feb. 1948, Marcian6 ed altri-P.M e De Biase
ricorrenti, Giur. It. 1948, II, 129.
21. Id. at 131.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 132.
24. Id. at 131-132.
25. Cass., sez. un. pen., 7 Feb. 1948, Giur. It. 1948, II, 133. See also COST. art. 25,
cl. 2 (providing that "[n]o punishment may be inflicted except by virtue of law in force at
the time the offence was committed").
26. Cass., sez. un. pen., 7 Feb. 1948, Giur. It. 1948, H, 133-134.
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apply to norms of an "exceptional and temporary" nature such as the
challenged measures and in fact prohibited any decriminalization of such
conduct once defined as criminal.2 7  Its second was to label the new
Constitutional provision prohibiting retroactive definition of criminal
conduct as merely "programmatic" (programmatica) in nature, thereby
serving only as guidance for legislative action, but not as susceptible of
judicial application. 28 The Court of Cassation accordingly showed itself
unwilling to be party to exculpation of collaborators with the then
occupying German forces or of an adherent of the fascist party. It was
likewise unwilling to be party to invalidation of the legislative decrees of
the post-fascist government.
The Council of State is the supreme administrative court under the
Italian system. In a decision also reached in 1948, within five months of
the effective date of the 1948 Constitution, its Fifth Section had to decide
whether a decree of the unelected transitional government that followed
the collapse of the fascist state, violated the Constitution.2 9 The decree
provided that no judicial challenge could be made against an
administrative decree concerning the award by a prefect of concessions
to use uncultivated agricultural land.30 The Council of State ruled the
challenged article of the decree to be unconstitutional because it
conflicted with the provision of Article 113 of the 1948 Constitution that
an act of the government is "always" subject to judicial challenge. 3' The
Council of State acknowledged the transitional provisions (discussed
supra) of the new Constitution that gave it the power to assess the
conformity of laws with the Constitution.32 It also noted the relevant
provision of the Constitution concerning the right to bring judicial
challenges against governmental acts to be an example of "norms already
complete and perfected in all their elements" and hence to be applied by
a court without the need of any further legislative enactment.33  So
ruling, it stated that there are "undoubtedly programmatic declarations"
in the Constitution, which could not as such be applied in the exercise of
27. Id.
28. See id. at 133-134 ("II quesito se la Costituzione contenga, per sua natura,
soltanto norme direttive va risolto negativamente. Giacch6 la Costituzione un
complesso di norme giuridiche che sono principalmente precettive, ma che possono pure
essere soltanto direttive o prograrmatiche ... nel senso che pongono principi di cui il
legislatore deve curare I'attuazione.").
29. Cons. stato, Decision no. 303, Section V, 26 May 1948, Prefetto di Avellino e
Cooperative Agricole "La Proletario" e "La Popolare" di Aquilonia, Giur. It 1948, III,
81.
30. Id. at 83.
31. Id. at 87.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 84.
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judicial review of the constitutionality of laws.34 This observation did
not, however, prevent the Council of State from upholding the challenge
to the constitutionality of the challenged act of the transitional
government.
35
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S REJECTION OF PROGRAMMATIC LISTING OF
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION AND ADOPTION OF THEIR
PEREMPTORY STATUS
The restrictive interpretation of the new civil rights contained in the
1948 Constitution as merely "programmatic" in nature was rejected by
the newly created Italian Constitutional Court in 1956 in its very first
decision. In that case, 30 cases involving criminal prosecution of alleged
violations of a statute requiring individuals to obtain permits from local
authorities authorizing them to distribute leaflets, use public
loudspeakers, attach posters to walls in public places etc., were
consolidated and referred to the Constitutional Court for ruling on
whether the statute and the criminalization of its violation violated the
free speech Article 21 of the Constitution. Interestingly, the requirement
of a permit was contemplated in provisions of article 113 of the Testo
Unico delle Leggi sulla Pubblica Sicurezza (unified text of the laws on
public safety) that had been adopted in 1931,36 while the measure
providing for criminalization of the violation of the permit requirement
was adopted by a legislative decree of 1947 that modified the Criminal
Code. The Constitutional Court declared both the 1931 and 1947
provisions unconstitutional in light of Article 21 of the Constitution
which provides:
Everyone has the right to freely express their thoughts in speech,
writing, or any other form of communication.
The press may not be subjected to any authorization or censorship.
The Constitutional Court ruled that, irrespective of whether the free
speech provision of the Italian Constitution is defined as programmatic
(programmatica), the Constitution was violated. It stated: "The well-
known distinction between precettive [peremptory] and programmatiche
34. Cons. stato, Decision no. 303, Section V, 26 May 1948, Prefetto di Avellino e
Cooperative Agricole "'La Proletario " e "La Popolare'" di Aquilonia, Giur. It. 1948, III,
83.
35. Id. at 87.
36. More specifically, Art. 113 of the Testo Unico delle Leggi di Pubblica Sicurezza
(TULPS), a consolidation of laws dealing with public safety issues, adopted by Royal
Decree no. 773 of June 18, 1931.
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[programmatic] constitutional provisions ... cannot be considered
decisive when dealing with the constitutional legitimacy of a statute.,
37
So ruling, the Constitutional Court assumed the role of invalidating,
with general effect, legislation from the fascist era and from the post-war
government that violated provisions of the new Constitution, thereby
affirming its power of judicial review.
The relationships among the lawyers and constitutional judges
involved in the Constitutional Court's first decision are of interest in
understanding how the Court's jurisprudence and Italian constitutional
doctrine evolved in harmony to support the institution of judicial review
of constitutionality in Italy. The lawyers involved in the case included
Italy's leading lawyers at the time, and many of them later become
members of the Constitutional Court. Many of the various lawyers and
judges involved in the case also became recognized as leading authors of
Italian doctrinal writings on constitutional matters.
38
37. Corte cost., 14 June 1956, n.1, Giur. Cost. (1956), I, 1 (in Italian: l...] 1a nota
distinzione fra norme precettive e norme programmatiche [... ] non 6 decisiva nei giudizi
di legittimitA costituzionale, potendo la illegittimitA costituzionale di una legge derivare,
in determinati casi, anche dalla sua non conciliabilitA con norme che si dicono
programmatiche, tanto pifi che in questa categoria sogliono essere comprese norme
costituzionali di contenuto diverso: da quelle che si limitano a tracciare programmi
generici di futura e incerta attuazione, perch6 subordinata al verificarsi di situazioni che
la consentano, a norme dove il programma, se cosi si voglia denominarlo, ha concretezza
che non pu6 non vincolare immediatamente il legislatore, ripercuotersi sulla
interpretazione della legislazione precedente e sulla perdurante efficacia di alcune parti di
questa; vi sono pure norme le quali fissano principi fondamentali, che anche essi si
riverberano sull'intera legislazione").
38. Among them it is worth mentioning Gaetano Azzariti, Gaspare Ambrosini,
Ernesto Battaglini, Piero Calamandrei, Giovanni Cassandro, Vezio Crisafulli, Massimo
Severo Giannini, Costantino Mortati, and Giuliano Vassalli.
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